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napalm-linux/CHANGELOG.md
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fix: run privileged commands on the exec channel, never typed into the shell
_sudo typed `echo '<password>' | sudo -S -p "" <command>` into netmiko's
interactive shell. bash kept it in its history, so every poll wrote the sudo
password into the login user's ~/.bash_history, and while the command ran it
was in the process list for every local user (NetOrk/netork#1039).

_sudo, _sudo_status and _run_privileged with a password now run on an exec
channel like run_command(privileged=True): the password reaches sudo -S on
stdin, there is no PTY to echo it, and the script starts with
`exec </dev/null` so a non-prompting sudo leaves it unread. The whole
command runs as root in one sh -c - before, only the part up to the first
`;`, `&&` or `|` did. The exit status comes from the channel.

The interactive session switches its history off before its first command.
get_vpn_tunnels with a password reads `wg show all dump` from the exec
channel instead of a temp file that held the private keys.
2026-10-12 22:51:07 +02:00

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# Changelog
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
## [Unreleased]
### Security
- `run_command(privileged=True, stdin=...)` raises `ValueError` while a sudo
password is set. `sudo -S` reads the password from stdin, and a sudo that does
not prompt (NOPASSWD, a cached timestamp) left it for the command, which read
it as the first line of the data: netOrk wrote it into a file that way
(NetOrk/netork#1029). Stage the data without privilege and have root install
that file. Without a sudo password (`sudo -n`) or for a root login, stdin
still goes to the command.
- The sudo password is no longer typed into the interactive shell
(NetOrk/netork#1039). Every privileged command ran there as
`echo '<password>' | sudo -S -p "" <command>`: bash kept it in its history,
so each poll wrote the password into the login user's `~/.bash_history`, and
while the command ran it was in the process list for every local user.
Privileged commands (`_sudo`, `_sudo_status`, and `_run_privileged` with a
sudo password) now run on an exec channel like `run_command(privileged=True)`:
the password reaches `sudo -S` on stdin, there is no PTY to echo it, and the
whole command runs as root in one `sh -c` (before, only the part up to the
first `;`, `&&` or `|` did, so `mv … && chown root:root …` failed its chown).
The interactive session also switches its history off before its first
command (` unset HISTFILE; set +o history`). **History files written before
this version may still hold the sudo password**: remove those lines from the
login user's `~/.bash_history` on your hosts and consider changing the
password. `_sudo_status` takes the exit status from the channel; it is `None`
only when the channel closed without one.
## [0.4.0] – 2026-10-08
### Added
- `get_virtual_ips()` through napalm-device-types' `VirtualIpsMixin` (4.2.0): the
addresses vip-manager and keepalived configuration lets float onto this host,
whether or not it holds them right now (NetOrk/netork#829). The command goes on
the exec channel (`run_command`): with its awk filter it is about 4 kB, past the
line the PTY reliably takes. Root first, then without it.
## [0.3.0] – 2026-10-08
### Removed
- `get_docker_info()`, `get_docker_outdated()`, `reconstruct_docker_run()` and
the `_docker_bin()` hook, with the image-ID helpers they used. netOrk reads
and handles containers itself over the Engine API, through
`open_container_engine()` (NetOrk/netork#765), and no longer calls them.
`run_device_action("fix_docker_permissions")` stays: letting the login user
use Docker is an OS action.
## [0.2.0] – 2026-10-07
### Added
- `run_command()` and `open_stream()`, the public command channel from
napalm-device-types 2.6.0: an exec channel on the existing SSH transport, so
no PTY, separate stderr and a real exit code. `privileged=True` runs as root
directly, through `sudo -S` with the password on stdin (never on the command
line), or through `sudo -n`, which fails instead of prompting.
- `ContainerEngineMixin`: `container_engines()` and `open_container_engine()`,
whose `open_api()` streams the Docker Engine API over `docker system
dial-stdio` (NetOrk/netork#765). The existing Docker methods are unchanged.
### Changed
- Requires napalm-device-types >= 2.6.0.
## [0.1.0] – 2026-05-29
### Added
- Initial release
- `LinuxDriver` inheriting from `napalm_device_types.OSDriver`
- SSH transport via Netmiko `linux` device type
- Auto-detection of package manager: `apt`, `dnf`, `yum`, `apk`, `pacman`
- Standard NAPALM methods: `get_facts()`, `get_interfaces()`, `get_interfaces_ip()`,
`get_arp_table()`, `get_config()`, `ping()`
- OS-specific methods: `get_packages()`, `get_pending_updates()`, `apply_updates()`,
`get_services()`, `get_users()`, `get_processes()`, `get_cron_jobs()`
- `apply_updates()` validates all package names against `^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\+\.]+$`
to prevent shell injection before passing them to the package manager
- SysV fallback for `get_services()` on non-systemd systems
- Unit tests with mocked SSH connections
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/chrismanivong/napalm-linux/compare/v0.1.0...HEAD
[0.1.0]: https://github.com/chrismanivong/napalm-linux/releases/tag/v0.1.0