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napalm-linux/CHANGELOG.md
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fix: refuse stdin to a privileged command while a sudo password is set
run_command(privileged=True, stdin=data) sent `sudo -S` with stdin =
<sudo password>\n + data. A sudo that does not prompt (NOPASSWD, a cached
timestamp) leaves the password line on stdin, and the command reads it as
the first line of the data - `cat > file` wrote it into the file
(NetOrk/netork#1029).

run_command now raises ValueError for that combination before opening a
channel. Stdin still reaches the command under `sudo -n` (no password set),
for a root login, and for unprivileged commands. Callers stage the data
without privilege and have root install the file. open_stream documents the
same caveat.
2026-10-12 20:41:06 +02:00

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# Changelog
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
## [Unreleased]
### Security
- `run_command(privileged=True, stdin=...)` raises `ValueError` while a sudo
password is set. `sudo -S` reads the password from stdin, and a sudo that does
not prompt (NOPASSWD, a cached timestamp) left it for the command, which read
it as the first line of the data: netOrk wrote it into a file that way
(NetOrk/netork#1029). Stage the data without privilege and have root install
that file. Without a sudo password (`sudo -n`) or for a root login, stdin
still goes to the command.
## [0.4.0] – 2026-10-08
### Added
- `get_virtual_ips()` through napalm-device-types' `VirtualIpsMixin` (4.2.0): the
addresses vip-manager and keepalived configuration lets float onto this host,
whether or not it holds them right now (NetOrk/netork#829). The command goes on
the exec channel (`run_command`): with its awk filter it is about 4 kB, past the
line the PTY reliably takes. Root first, then without it.
## [0.3.0] – 2026-10-08
### Removed
- `get_docker_info()`, `get_docker_outdated()`, `reconstruct_docker_run()` and
the `_docker_bin()` hook, with the image-ID helpers they used. netOrk reads
and handles containers itself over the Engine API, through
`open_container_engine()` (NetOrk/netork#765), and no longer calls them.
`run_device_action("fix_docker_permissions")` stays: letting the login user
use Docker is an OS action.
## [0.2.0] – 2026-10-07
### Added
- `run_command()` and `open_stream()`, the public command channel from
napalm-device-types 2.6.0: an exec channel on the existing SSH transport, so
no PTY, separate stderr and a real exit code. `privileged=True` runs as root
directly, through `sudo -S` with the password on stdin (never on the command
line), or through `sudo -n`, which fails instead of prompting.
- `ContainerEngineMixin`: `container_engines()` and `open_container_engine()`,
whose `open_api()` streams the Docker Engine API over `docker system
dial-stdio` (NetOrk/netork#765). The existing Docker methods are unchanged.
### Changed
- Requires napalm-device-types >= 2.6.0.
## [0.1.0] – 2026-05-29
### Added
- Initial release
- `LinuxDriver` inheriting from `napalm_device_types.OSDriver`
- SSH transport via Netmiko `linux` device type
- Auto-detection of package manager: `apt`, `dnf`, `yum`, `apk`, `pacman`
- Standard NAPALM methods: `get_facts()`, `get_interfaces()`, `get_interfaces_ip()`,
`get_arp_table()`, `get_config()`, `ping()`
- OS-specific methods: `get_packages()`, `get_pending_updates()`, `apply_updates()`,
`get_services()`, `get_users()`, `get_processes()`, `get_cron_jobs()`
- `apply_updates()` validates all package names against `^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\+\.]+$`
to prevent shell injection before passing them to the package manager
- SysV fallback for `get_services()` on non-systemd systems
- Unit tests with mocked SSH connections
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/chrismanivong/napalm-linux/compare/v0.1.0...HEAD
[0.1.0]: https://github.com/chrismanivong/napalm-linux/releases/tag/v0.1.0