Priority: P2 (important and urgent): hosts, ARP table, SSIDs, radios, Wi-Fi clients and port forwards are always empty.
_read_dal_or_page does parse_dal(json.loads(self._fetch_page("cgi-bin/DAL?oid=..."))). A GET of the DAL answers sealed, {"content": ..., "iv": ...}, just like the PUT in _dal_query. The parsers get that envelope, find none of their keys, and return empty data. No exception is raised, so the HTML fallback never runs either.
Seen on a VMG4005-B50A: every DAL GET (lanhosts, WIFI_RADIO, wlan, ...) comes back sealed. _status_page (#23) decrypts it and is the pattern to reuse. Once it is decrypted, the parsers' key guesses (hosts, entries, radios, ...) need checking against real answers too: the gateway puts its data under Object. The tests in tests/test_failed_reads.py feed the parsers unsealed JSON, so they never caught this.
Priority: P2 (important and urgent): hosts, ARP table, SSIDs, radios, Wi-Fi clients and port forwards are always empty.
`_read_dal_or_page` does `parse_dal(json.loads(self._fetch_page("cgi-bin/DAL?oid=...")))`. A GET of the DAL answers sealed, `{"content": ..., "iv": ...}`, just like the PUT in `_dal_query`. The parsers get that envelope, find none of their keys, and return empty data. No exception is raised, so the HTML fallback never runs either.
Seen on a VMG4005-B50A: every DAL GET (`lanhosts`, `WIFI_RADIO`, `wlan`, ...) comes back sealed. `_status_page` (#23) decrypts it and is the pattern to reuse. Once it is decrypted, the parsers' key guesses (`hosts`, `entries`, `radios`, ...) need checking against real answers too: the gateway puts its data under `Object`. The tests in `tests/test_failed_reads.py` feed the parsers unsealed JSON, so they never caught this.
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Priority: P2 (important and urgent): hosts, ARP table, SSIDs, radios, Wi-Fi clients and port forwards are always empty.
_read_dal_or_pagedoesparse_dal(json.loads(self._fetch_page("cgi-bin/DAL?oid=..."))). A GET of the DAL answers sealed,{"content": ..., "iv": ...}, just like the PUT in_dal_query. The parsers get that envelope, find none of their keys, and return empty data. No exception is raised, so the HTML fallback never runs either.Seen on a VMG4005-B50A: every DAL GET (
lanhosts,WIFI_RADIO,wlan, ...) comes back sealed._status_page(#23) decrypts it and is the pattern to reuse. Once it is decrypted, the parsers' key guesses (hosts,entries,radios, ...) need checking against real answers too: the gateway puts its data underObject. The tests intests/test_failed_reads.pyfeed the parsers unsealed JSON, so they never caught this.