CI / test (3.10) (push) Successful in 46s
CI / test (3.11) (push) Successful in 39s
CI / test (3.12) (push) Successful in 53s
CI / test (3.10) (pull_request) Successful in 44s
CI / test (3.11) (pull_request) Successful in 47s
CI / test (3.12) (pull_request) Successful in 47s
Now that a whole _sudo line runs as root, `mv /tmp/netork_snmpd.conf /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf && chown root:root … && chmod 644 …` would have let a local user plant a symlink at the fixed /tmp path and have root's chown and chmod follow it (e.g. to /etc/shadow). The same held for 00proxy. _install_file_as_root stages the content unprivileged in a fresh mktemp file (umask 077), checks the path it got back, and root installs it as a new regular file next to the target and renames it over: nothing root runs follows a symlink or changes the owner or mode of an existing path. Nothing runs as root when staging failed. get_vpn_tunnels always reads `wg show all dump` from the exec channel; the predictable /tmp/.netork_wg_<hash> file holding the private keys is gone.
5.2 KiB
5.2 KiB
Changelog
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on Keep a Changelog, and this project adheres to Semantic Versioning.
Unreleased
Security
run_command(privileged=True, stdin=...)raisesValueErrorwhile a sudo password is set.sudo -Sreads the password from stdin, and a sudo that does not prompt (NOPASSWD, a cached timestamp) left it for the command, which read it as the first line of the data: netOrk wrote it into a file that way (NetOrk/netork#1029). Stage the data without privilege and have root install that file. Without a sudo password (sudo -n) or for a root login, stdin still goes to the command.- The sudo password is no longer typed into the interactive shell
(NetOrk/netork#1039). Every privileged command ran there as
echo '<password>' | sudo -S -p "" <command>: bash kept it in its history, so each poll wrote the password into the login user's~/.bash_history, and while the command ran it was in the process list for every local user. Privileged commands (_sudo,_sudo_status, and_run_privilegedwith a sudo password) now run on an exec channel likerun_command(privileged=True): the password reachessudo -Son stdin, there is no PTY to echo it, and the whole command runs as root in onesh -c(before, only the part up to the first;,&&or|did, somv … && chown root:root …failed its chown). The interactive session also switches its history off before its first command (unset HISTFILE; set +o history). History files written before this version may still hold the sudo password: remove those lines from the login user's~/.bash_historyon your hosts and consider changing the password._sudo_statustakes the exit status from the channel; it isNoneonly when the channel closed without one. - The snmpd and apt proxy fixes no longer stage their files at a fixed path in
/tmp (
/tmp/netork_snmpd.conf,/tmp/netork_00proxy) and thenmv,chownandchmodthem as root. Another local user could create that path first as a symlink, for example to/etc/shadow, and root'schown/chmodfollowed it. The content now goes to a freshmktempfile underumask 077, written without privilege, and rootinstalls it as a new file owned by root (mode 644) next to the target and renames it into place (_install_file_as_root). Nothing runs as root when staging failed. get_vpn_tunnels()without a sudo password no longer writeswg show all dump(which includes the interfaces' private keys) to the predictable/tmp/.netork_wg_<hash>; the dump comes straight from the exec channel.
[0.4.0] – 2026-10-08
Added
get_virtual_ips()through napalm-device-types'VirtualIpsMixin(4.2.0): the addresses vip-manager and keepalived configuration lets float onto this host, whether or not it holds them right now (NetOrk/netork#829). The command goes on the exec channel (run_command): with its awk filter it is about 4 kB, past the line the PTY reliably takes. Root first, then without it.
[0.3.0] – 2026-10-08
Removed
get_docker_info(),get_docker_outdated(),reconstruct_docker_run()and the_docker_bin()hook, with the image-ID helpers they used. netOrk reads and handles containers itself over the Engine API, throughopen_container_engine()(NetOrk/netork#765), and no longer calls them.run_device_action("fix_docker_permissions")stays: letting the login user use Docker is an OS action.
[0.2.0] – 2026-10-07
Added
run_command()andopen_stream(), the public command channel from napalm-device-types 2.6.0: an exec channel on the existing SSH transport, so no PTY, separate stderr and a real exit code.privileged=Trueruns as root directly, throughsudo -Swith the password on stdin (never on the command line), or throughsudo -n, which fails instead of prompting.ContainerEngineMixin:container_engines()andopen_container_engine(), whoseopen_api()streams the Docker Engine API overdocker system dial-stdio(NetOrk/netork#765). The existing Docker methods are unchanged.
Changed
- Requires napalm-device-types >= 2.6.0.
0.1.0 – 2026-05-29
Added
- Initial release
LinuxDriverinheriting fromnapalm_device_types.OSDriver- SSH transport via Netmiko
linuxdevice type - Auto-detection of package manager:
apt,dnf,yum,apk,pacman - Standard NAPALM methods:
get_facts(),get_interfaces(),get_interfaces_ip(),get_arp_table(),get_config(),ping() - OS-specific methods:
get_packages(),get_pending_updates(),apply_updates(),get_services(),get_users(),get_processes(),get_cron_jobs() apply_updates()validates all package names against^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\+\.]+$to prevent shell injection before passing them to the package manager- SysV fallback for
get_services()on non-systemd systems - Unit tests with mocked SSH connections