feat: TLS certificates by trust on first use
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Devices ship self-signed certificates, so a driver either fails the CA check on every one of them or turns verification off and sends the login to whatever answers on the address. tls_certificates pins the certificate by its SHA-256 fingerprint instead, shaped like ssh_host_keys: the caller passes the fingerprint to expect by port (optional_args["tls_fingerprints"]), the driver refuses any other certificate before a request carries credentials, and every certificate seen goes to optional_args["tls_certificate_observer"]. Without a fingerprint the first certificate is accepted. CertificateCheck checks the certificate in a handshake of its own, then pins a requests session to it (urllib3's assert_fingerprint, direct and through a proxy), so no other host can step in between the check and the login. Refs NAPALM/napalm-hpe-aruba-procurve#17
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@@ -328,6 +328,26 @@ caller's; `ssh_host_keys.HostKeyCheck` is how every SSH driver verifies against
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A caller that passes neither key gets first use on every connection, as before; a driver
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that ignores both still connects. Old and new versions on either side keep working.
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### TLS certificates: trust on first use
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The same for a driver's HTTPS API. Devices ship self-signed certificates, so a CA check
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fails on all of them and turning verification off trusts whatever answers;
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`tls_certificates.CertificateCheck` pins the certificate by its fingerprint instead
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(NAPALM/napalm-hpe-aruba-procurve#17). No CA is consulted.
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- **In:** `optional_args["tls_fingerprints"]` = `{"443": "SHA256:AB:CD:…"}`, by port: the
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SHA-256 of the DER certificate as `openssl x509 -fingerprint -sha256` prints it (prefix,
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colons and case optional). With one, any other certificate is refused *before* a request
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carries credentials and the connection raises `TlsCertificateMismatch` (a
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`ConnectionException` naming both fingerprints). Without one, the first certificate is
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accepted. A driver does not fall back to another transport on a mismatch.
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- **Out:** `optional_args["tls_certificate_observer"]`, a callable, gets one dict per
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connection: `{"host", "port", "seen": {"fingerprint"}, "expected", "accepted"}`.
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- **requests:** `check = CertificateCheck(optional_args, host, port)`;
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`check.verify_server(timeout)` before the login, `check.pin(session)` so every later
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connection of the session must present that certificate, the login inside
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`with check.refusing():`, then `check.observe()`.
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## Design principle: generic vs. device-specific logic
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When adding behavior to a device-type base class, split it along one line: **would
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